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Peer to Peer Digital Rights Management using Blockchain
Abstract
by James Rinaldi
University of the Pacific
2018
Content distribution networks deliver content like videos, apps, and music to users through
servers deployed in multiple datacenters to increase availability and delivery speed of con-
tent. The motivation of this work is to create a content distribution network that maintains a
consumer’s rights and access to works they have purchased indefinitely. If a user purchases
content from a traditional content distribution network, they lose access to the content when
the service is no longer available. The system uses a peer to peer network for content dis-
tribution along with a blockchain for digital rights management. This combination may
give users indefinite access to purchased works. The system benefits content rights owners
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The motivation for this work is to create a content distribution network (CDN) that
maintains the consumer’s rights and access to works they have purchased like music,
movies, books, and software indefinitely. The problem with current systems is that when a
user purchases an electronic copy of a work from a traditional CDN they lose access when
the CDN service is permanently or temporarily unavailable. The benefit of using a peer to
peer (P2P) file distribution network for content delivery and a blockchain for digital rights
management (DRM) is that it can give users indefinite access to purchased works.
CDNs use DRM systems to manage customers’ digital content rights. DRM protects
a content creator’s revenues by letting only authorized consumers access a work. This
paper considers a DRM system failed when the servers on which it relies are no longer
operated. Servers are shut down by their operators if they are legally compelled or operating
the servers is unprofitable. DRM systems can be unprofitable from server cost or from
having to rewrite DRM client software to keep up with advances in operating system design
[4]. DRM services are considered failed from the consumer’s perspective and from an
economic perspective. Consumers lose current and expected value when DRM services are
shutdown. Unprofitable servers produce less economic value than they consume and have
failed economically.
DRM system failures have negatively impacted both consumers and businesses. Failed
DRM systems have hurt consumers by reducing availability of purchased content. A failed
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DRM system that hurt consumers is the shutdown of Yahoo! Music. On September 30,
2008 Yahoo! Music shut down their license key servers [5]. This shutdown stopped con-
sumers from downloading purchased media. To transfer content consumers had to burn
the content to CDs and then rip the content to a new computer [5]. Another failed DRM
system was Diesel eBooks which in March 2014 announced that their servers would shut
down at the end of the month [6]. Ubisoft’s DRM services were temporarily interrupted by
a denial of service (DOS) attack. Ubisoft’s games require communication with a server to
be played and the DOS attack prevented some player’s games from communicating with
the server. These players were unable to play their games during the attack [7].
Failed DRM systems hurt businesses who operate them while they are unprofitable.
Walmart announced on September 26, 2008 they were shutting down their DRM servers.
But after customer complaints Walmart reversed the decision [8]. Microsoft announced
that on August 31, 2008 that MSN music servers would be shutdown preventing users from
authorizing new devices to play music. But after customer complaints Microsoft supported
adding new devices to MSN music until the end of 2011 [9]. The DRM systems failed
because the companies were financially better off by ending services. Announcing the end
of services hurts the company’s reputation so they decide to continue service and reduce
profits.
The solution to prevent failure of a DRM system is to decentralize its operation. De-
centralization should be both technological and financial with a community of peers sup-
porting the DRM system. Centralized DRM systems have the operating company as a
single point of failure. Failure occurs when the company goes out of business or because
the DRM system becomes unprofitable. Short term unavailability occurs during power
11
failure, natural disaster, or cyber attack. The decentralized system can have a partial or a
complete failure. Partial failure occurs in a decentralized system if the last copy of a file
is unavailable. Total failure occurs in a decentralized system when every peer that par-
ticipates in the system shuts down. Decentralized operation will prevent financial failure
by distributing costs among the community operating the system. A decentralized system
mitigates the causes of short term failure since power failures and natural disasters won’t
cause correlated peer failures assuming peers are diverse in physical location.
The decentralized DRM system proposed here will utilize P2P filesharing and blockchain
technology. P2P filesharing creates a CDN that is decentralized and has each client as a po-
tential server. Blockchain creates a distributed database to contain rights information. This
thesis will present a review of the literature in Chapter 2, a background of the systems used
to implement the distributed DRM system in Chapter 3, the design of the DRM system in
Chapter 4, its implementation in Chapter 5, and its testing and evaluation in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Peer to Peer File Sharing
Studies of P2P network architectures place emphasis on improving network efficiency
and reliability. The work of Tang et al. [10] reviews the history of traditional, P2P, and
cloud based CDNs. Tang found that first generation P2P CDNs are centralized and un-
structured, with a central server used to coordinate peers. An example of a first generation
network is Napster. The advantage of this type of system is that peers do not have to store
complex routing data. A significant disadvantage of this type of system is that a shutdown
or failure of the central server will collapse the entire P2P network [10]. Tang found that
second generation P2P networks do not use centralized servers and are decentralized and
unstructured [10]. Second generation P2P networks, such as Gnutella, relay queries among
all peers until the desired file is located. Redundant messages in this type of P2P network
inefficiently waste bandwidth, causing poor scalability [10]. Other second generation P2P
networks, such as Chord, use a distributed hash table (DHT) for locating files. Large DHT
networks do not work well due to routing data storage [10]. Third generation P2P networks
combine properties of the first and second generations. An example of a third generation is
BitTorrent (BT). BT’s trackers are first generation central servers except they track specific
files instead of all files. BT can use a DHT instead of a tracker. BT splits files into multiple
chunks, increasing replication speed in the P2P network by allowing downloaders to begin
13
uploading part way through the download [10]. A summary of the generations identified
by Tang et al are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Generations of P2P Networks
Centralized Structured Reliable Scalable Year
1st Generation Yes No No Yes 1999 (Napster)
2nd Generation No Yes Yes No 2000 (Gnutella)
3rd Generation Yes/No No/Yes Yes Yes 2002 (BT)
Stoica et al. [1] introduce a P2P network lookup protocol called Chord. The Chord
protocol maps a key to a P2P node, so peers can find the node with a desired file. Chord
divides routing information among nodes so they only store log(N) entries and can query
other nodes when missing information is required. Figure 1 shows example routing in-
formation. It contains a key in the start column, the node that is holding the key in the
successor column, and the number of keys this node tracks. Chord finds desired files in
log(N) messages. Chord can add and remove nodes from the routing table in at most
log2(N) messages with a high probability of success. Chord evenly distributes files among
the nodes to balance network load.
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Figure 1: Chord Architecture [1]
Jagadish et al. [2] introduce a P2P lookup protocol tree structure called Balanced Tree
Overlay Network (Baton), shown in Figure 2. Baton maps a key to a P2P node and uses
the tree structure to perform range queries adding additional functionality. Baton can add
and remove nodes in log(N) messages improving upon Chord which could do so in log2(N)
messages. Baton can find a file or perform a range query in log(N) operations. Baton avoids
bottlenecking of communication caused in trees when nodes from one side of the root must
communicate with nodes on the other side of the root. Baton avoids this bottlenecking
by adding a link between nodes on the left side of the tree with their analogous node on
the right side of the tree. Baton nodes also have links to the two nodes to their left and
two nodes to their right at the same level. These additional links reduce bottlenecks and
increase robustness as nodes join and leave the network. Using figure 2 if node m needs a
15
file held by node i it can immediately communicate with node i. But if node m wants a file
held by node h then node m will pass the request to node l since node m knows that node l
knows the location of node h.
Figure 2: Baton Architecture [2]
Tsolis et al. [3] introduce the Autonomous Range Tree (ART), shown in Figure 3.
ART nodes store a binary tree with links between each node at the same level. ART nodes
also store a directory called a Random Spine Index (RSI). The RSI contains links to random
nodes at every level of the ART. The ART is more efficient than many popular P2P archi-
tectures [3]. ART finds keys in log2blog(N) messages. The maximum routing table size for
ART is N1/4/logcN. ART updates routing information in log(log(N)) messages [3].
16
Figure 3: ART Architecture [3]
Peltotalo et al. [11] combine multicasting with P2P CDNs. A multicast server sends
data to multiple clients by sending the data with special instructions telling the network to
send it to all the clients. Peercasting is the combination of P2P filesharing and multicas-
ting [11]. Peltotalo found that peercasting optimizes network usage if used in large scale
CDNs. Delco is their prototype of peercasting and is based on BT. Delco can be run in
peercasting and non-peercasting mode allowing users whose ISP does not allow multicast-
ing to participate in the network. Multicast support is most common in networks to deliver
IPTV but is not commonly supported on the public internet.
2.2 DRM
DRM uses multiple approaches to protect content [4]. Controlling access to content is
the first line of defense. Allowing only authorized users to download content reduces the
number of places that leaks could originate and requires a leaker to purchase the content.
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Cryptography is the second line of defense. Cryptography prevents content from being
stored on disk or RAM in plain text. Clients request decryption keys if they do not have
them. If the content is rented the keys expire when the rental period ends. Content is
decrypted in small portions and is stored in RAM unencrypted for a limited amount of
time, to protect against attackers reading the content from RAM. Once decrypted, content
is sent through a secure channel, like High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP),
to the display. The last line of defense is used after content has been leaked. Forensic
marking uniquely identifies the purchaser of a content, this helps track down the leakers of
the content and is used to discourage leakers. Digital watermarking is a form of forensic
marking that changes color or sound values slightly and is only detectable with the detector
and secret key.
DRM systems operate in untrusted environments requiring methods to secure opera-
tion [4]. Tamper resistant hardware offers protection against physical or logical attacks.
The processor, RAM, and storage in tamper resistant hardware is not physically accessi-
ble and detects intrusion attempts. Tamper resistant hardware is used for encryption and
decryption to protect the secret keys and the content. Tamper resistant software uses pro-
gramming practices, obfuscation, and encryption to prevent analysis and manipulation of
software. To prevent static analysis the software is obfuscated and can be encrypted with
a driver program that unencrypts the software to run it. To prevent run time analysis the
software detects the use of debuggers or if it is in a virtual machine. If it is being analyzed,
it will stop execution at a random point. Programing practices like the principle of least
privilege and compartmentalization are used to minimize the effect of attacks. Multiple
versions of functionally equivalent software can be distributed to prevent universal attack
18
tools.
2.3 P2P with DRM
Current work on integrating DRM into P2P CDNs varies in DRM method and P2P
network architecture. DRM methods found in literature encrypt content, encrypt keys,
watermark content, require hardware, or require an operating system interface [12] [3] [13].
Examples of P2P DRM include fully P2P systems and others that have central key or rights
management servers.
Shi et al. [14] implement a P2P research network called vuCRN. The vuCRN net-
work is for distributing PDF files. Adobe’s Extensible Metadata Platform embeds rights
information into PDF files. The types of rights supported by vuCRN include unrestricted,
reproducible, and personal use only. Juxtapose P2P networking software coordinates peer
communication in vuCRN. The work does not specify how the rights meta-data added by
the scheme is enforced.
Tsolis et al. [3] combine P2P image sharing and digital watermarking. Whenever a
node receives an image it watermarks the image with its key. The digital watermarking is
invisible to viewers but can be found by a detector. The detector can find each key in the
image establishing rights enforcement and assisting in transaction tracking [3]. The P2P
network used is the ART described in section 2.1.
Chen et al. [12] increase privacy while combining DRM and P2P file sharing. First
the content provider (CP) generates a master key to encrypt the file. The master key is
hidden using Shamir’s threshold algorithm, splitting the master key into multiple parts
called shadow keys. No information is revealed about the master key until it is recovered.
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The shadow keys are distributed among the P2P network nodes. The peers encrypt the
shadow keys using a group key. Users downloading a file use the group key to request the
shadow keys from the other nodes. The user recovers the master key with the shadow keys
and decrypts the file. The encryption process hides the file content and decryption keys.
The P2P nodes do not know with which user they are communicating [12]. Third parties
watching network traffic do not know which file is being transferred and do not learn any
portion of the decryption key.
Chang et al. [15] describe methods of key distribution for P2P Internet Protocol Televi-
sion (IPTV). Two key distribution methods are presented, one uses asymetric-cryptogram-
family key distribution (ACF) and the other uses private-key encryption (PKE) [15]. ACF
protects by requiring peers to decrypt content and encrypt it with their private key be-
fore forwarding the content. PKE offers protection by encrypting the content issuer’s pri-
vate key. ACF has better DRM protection than PKE, but PKE is more cost effective than
ACF [15]. Both ACF and PKE rely on a central key management and rights issuer server.
PKE is more efficient than ACF because the peers decrypt a smaller amount of data less
often. PKE reduces both cryptographic processing and key request traffic [15]. The authors
suggest increasing the security of PKE through periodic distribution of a new master key.
Kumar et al. [13] propose DRM middleware (DMW). DMW is designed to be used
in a P2P network. DMW utilizes a hardware component and the device’s operating system
(OS) to enforce copyright. DMW communicates with the OS to gain information about
the use of copyrighted content. DMW then instructs the OS to stop actions that violate
copyright. The hardware component decrypts content just in time for the user. DMW
proposes to use a content information exchange not described by Kumar et al. [13]. The
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work of Kumar et al. is a research proposal that does not appear to have been developed
further.
2.4 Blockchain with DRM
Kishigami et al. [16] describe The Blockchain Based Content Distribution System.
This system manages access rights to 4k video using a blockchain. This allows copyright
owners to manage the permissions of the content including removing permission to use
content from a user. This system does not allow off-line viewing of content since the client
requires a transaction ID from miners on the network to decode the content. The design
proposed in this thesis differs from the work of Kishigami et al. since it has a built in
currency which allows for decentralized purchasing.
Herbert and Litchfield [17] use a blockchain for software license validation. The au-
thors identify two blockchain forms in license validation. In the Master Bitcoin Model, a
consumer proves ownership by showing that they own a Bitcoin that originated from the
software vendor. The Bespoke Model is the Master Bitcoin Model with additional data
fields available. This allows the software maker to store license information like time until
license expiration. The Bespoke Model was implemented for a single user owning a single
license. Future work mentioned is allowing clients to hold hundreds of copies of a license.
McConaghy and Holtzman [18] use the Bitcoin blockchain to record image ownership.
The legal registry stores the terms of service and a timestamp. The registry is stored on the
blockchain with ownership information. A web crawler uses machine learning to detect
images that have been placed on a website without the owner’s permission.
Ujo uses Ethereum to enable music publishing [19]. Ujo demonstrated proof of
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concept by publishing Imogen Heap’s ’Tiny Human’ using Ethereum. The Ethereum
blockchain is used by Ujo for payments, rights management, and identity storage for artists.
Ujo uses Interplanetary File System (IPFS) for data transfer.
PeerTracks is being developed to allow for streaming and retail music sales using
blockchain [20]. PeerTracks uses the Muse blockchain, which is specifically for Peer-
Tracks. PeerTracks includes a tipping and patronage system. Muse ”monetizes attention”
by allocating new cryptocurrency to each active listener during a day and then distributing
the cryptocurrency to content creators based on user consumption [21].
DECENT is a blockchain based CDN for any kind of file [22]. DECENT uses IPFS for
distribution. DECENT uses a custom blockchain with delegative proof of stake (DPoS) for
mining. DPoS essentially has peers vote for miners using their cryptocurrency and these
elected miners create blocks. DECENT creates a rating system for content that cannot
be manipulated like normal online reviews. DECENT allows for custom tokens allowing




A blockchain is a database that is securely stored and updated by members of a P2P
network. The first example of a blockchain is the Bitcoin blockchain which was described
by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [23]. The purpose of the Bitcoin blockchain is to manage the
Bitcoin cryptocurrency. A cryptocurrency is a digital currency that uses cryptography for
security [24].
Blockchains are made of blocks of transactions which are chained together through
a cryptographic hash of the previous block. The blocks contain a cryptographic hash, a
nonce, a timestamp, and a set of transactions. The nonce is a random number used in
the mining process. The cryptographic hash of the previous block establishes a sequential
order. A diagram of a blockchain is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Bitcoin Blockchain
The accounts on the blockchain are called wallets which are a public/private key pair.
The private key signs transactions to prove that the owner of the sending wallet is mak-
ing the transaction. All the transactions are public, but anonymity is considered established
through not knowing the owner of each wallet [23]. The Bitcoin peer network is an unstruc-
tured P2P network run by all nodes. Nodes use a list of previous nodes for peer discovery,
and if the previous nodes do not lead to peers they contact one of multiple ”DNS servers”
for peer discovery. The DNS servers are like the BitTorrent tracker system.
The process of generating the blocks of the blockchain is called mining and a peer who
mines a block is known as a miner. Before mining a block, the miner receives and verifies
transactions. If it receives too many transactions to fit in one block, the miner decides
which transactions will be in the block it tries to mine. To mine a block of transactions
a miner uses the proof of work scheme. The miner guesses a value for the block’s nonce
so that when the block is hashed it will be less than a threshold value [23]. The threshold
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value is adjusted to change the difficulty if blocks are being mined either too slowly or too
quickly compared to a targeted time between each block [23].
When a miner creates a valid block whose hash is less than the threshold value it is
broadcasted to the peer network. The peers check the validity of the transactions and the
hash of the block. The mining process is expensive to create blocks and cheap to verify
blocks, requiring many hash operations to create a block but only one to verify the block.
Mining is incentivized by giving miners Bitcoin for each block mined, by generating new
Bitcoin and paying transaction fees [23]. The maximum number of Bitcoin generated is 21
million and the amount of new bitcoin decreases as the number of blocks increases [23].
Peers in the blockchain network assume the longest blockchain is the correct blockchain,
which is important for security [23].
The security of the blockchain relies on multiple assumptions. The first assumption
is that public key cryptography is secure. An attacker that can calculate others’ private
keys can create fake transactions. The second assumption is that the cryptographic hash
algorithm is secure. An attacker that can generate a new block whose hash matches an ex-
isting block can replace the block compromising the integrity of the blockchain. The third
assumption is that an attacker will not possess more processing power than all the honest
miners, which is known as a 51% attack. Attackers could censor or delay transactions by
not placing them in their blocks or generate an alternative blockchain that tries to replace
the honest blockchain. The fourth assumption is that a miner must use brute force methods
to mine a block [25]. If a miner can use a more efficient method they could perform a 51%
attack more easily.
The risk of a malicious blockchain replacing the legitimate blockchain is mitigated by
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economic incentive [23]. If a fake blockchain replaces the honest blockchain users will
abandon the network. Once the network is abandoned the economic value associated with
the accounts in the blockchain will be significantly reduced. This will reduce the reward an
attacker will receive. This economic disincentive will deter economically rational attackers.
Attackers who are economically irrational and desire to destroy the legitimate blockchain
will not be deterred.
3.2 Ethereum
Ethereum is an open source blockchain being developed by the Ethereum Founda-
tion [26]. The Ethereum blockchain builds upon the concepts of the Bitcoin blockchain
by creating an environment for executing code stored in the blockchain. The Ethereum
blockchain database stores values representing the Ether cryptocurrency and programs
called contracts which have been compiled to bytecode. Ethereum uses public/private key
wallets. The blocks of the Ethereum blockchain store a hash of the previous block, a
nonce, a timestamp, transactions, the bytecode of contracts created in the block, and other
fields [27].
The contracts stored on blockchain are like classes in object oriented programming.
Contracts contain state variables, which are stored on the blockchain and functions which
have access to the state variables. State variables can only be modified by a function in-
side the same contract but can be viewed by anyone with access to the blockchain [26].
Functions modify state variables, call functions of other contracts, or send Ether [26].
Many contracts currently on the public Ethereum network create tokens. A token is
a digital currency whose account balances are managed by the contract. Another use of
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contracts on the public Ethereum network is Cryptokitties. Cryptokitties are virtual cats
stored on the blockchain with unique genomes that can be bought, sold, and bred.
Contracts in the blockchain are executed in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
[26]. The EVM creates a consistent execution environment among network peers. The
EVM does not have access to networking, storage, or other processes, increasing security
[26]. Contracts are written in Solidity, a Turing complete programming language. The
Solidity source is compiled into EVM bytecode. The compilation into EVM bytecode
minimizes the size of each contract to avoid bloating the blockchain [26].
Contracts can be programmed, deployed, and executed by anyone. A contract is de-
ployed to an address on the blockchain, allowing it to receive transactions. Ether is paid to
deploy a contract to the blockchain and the amount depends on the size of the bytecode.
The Ether fee maximum, which can change over time, limits the size of bytecode which
can be deployed. Contracts are executed when they receive a transaction called a message
call. Owned contracts are a common security feature allowing a single account to execute
some or all its functions. All full Ethereum nodes validate the state of the blockchain. So,
when contracts are executed on the blockchain all full nodes run the code in the EVM.
The EVM uses the data portion of the message call to execute a function. Ether in
the message call pays for the execution of the contract [26]. The transaction limit for each
block in Ethereum is based on computational complexity of the transactions in the EVM.
The computational complexity is measured in units called gas. Each computation during
the execution of the contract is charged, to prevent denial of service attacks using infinite
loops to stall miners. The attack could prevent the miner from making a block or prevent
other contracts from being executed in the current block. The charge assigns a price to the
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attack, and execution halts when the message call runs out of funds. Once halted, changes
to state variables will be reverted [26].
The EVM has a maximum call stack height of 1024 to make it deterministic and
independent of the implementation language. Each miner needs the same answer when
executing the contract, requiring the EVM to be deterministic. Contract execution fails
when stack height is exceeded [26]. The stack height introduces a security vulnerability.
An attacker can build the call stack before calling another contract causing it or a contract
it calls to fail [26]. The effect of the failure depends on the contract attacked. The call stack
vulnerability can be prevented through proper contract programming.
The mining process of Ethereum uses proof of work. Proof of work in Ethereum
differs from Bitcoin proof of work and is ASIC resistant [26]. ASIC mining leads to cen-
tralization of a decentralized system and weakens the benefits of building a distributed
system [26]. The Ethereum proof of work requires a large, currently 1 GB, directed acyclic
graph during the mining process. The nonce needs a small part of the DAG and miners
either generate a portion of the DAG during each mining attempt or store the entire DAG
in RAM [26]. Generating pieces of the DAG for each nonce is too expensive to effectively
mine, requiring storage of the DAG in RAM [26]. RAM I/O limits benefits of ASICs be-
cause the nonces for mining blocks are randomly distributed in the DAG and RAM is the
most efficient way to randomly access data.
Verification is cheap for clients, requiring a small portion of the DAG which can be
generated. The DAG changes every 30000 blocks and is based on the block height allowing
pregeneration of the DAG. The DAG change reduces the speed up from shared memory
architecture. The DAG is pregeneratable, so generation does not stop mining temporarily
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[26].
Mining is incentivized with new Ether and fees paid for transactions and contract
execution. There is no limit to the total number of Ether. A block that is mined, and could
have been a valid block, but was mined after another valid block is called an uncle. Figure
5 shows uncles in Ethereum. Miners who generate uncle blocks are given a partial reward
in Ethereum, unlike in Bitcoin. The uncle reward prevents centralization risks with a short
time between blocks [28].
Figure 5: Uncles in Ethereum
3.3 CDN
CDNs for delivering DRM protected content are made of three services: the merchant
service, the rights management service, and the content delivery service [4]. Some ex-
amples of large CDNs with DRM are Netflix, Amazon Video, and iTunes. The merchant
service sells digital rights. First the merchant service confirms payment and then it tells
the rights management service to update the user’s database entry. The rights management
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service maintains the digital rights database. The rights management service sends license
keys to clients, so they can request and decrypt content. The content delivery service deliv-
ers content to authorized users. Content delivery in a CDN relies on geographically diverse
servers to minimize delivery time. CDN services can be operated by multiple parties. For
example, the content delivery service can be outsourced. Many ISPs operate CDNs with
servers inside their network so companies can quickly deliver content to their customers. If
all services, merchant, rights management, and content delivery are P2P the CDN will not




The design goal of this thesis is to make a P2P CDN that benefits both consumers and
content producers. Consumers want to purchase content knowing that they will not have
their ownership revoked in the future. Content producers want to sell their works without
maintaining servers. The CDN uses a blockchain to maintain the consumer’s rights to
works indefinitely. Through P2P filesharing the CDN distributes content creators works in
a low cost manner and gives consumers indefinite access. An overview of the system is
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: System Overview
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The content distribution network will use an Ethereum blockchain to operate the mer-
chant and rights management services. The content distribution network will use a P2P
network like the BitTorrent tracker system as the content delivery service. An Ethereum
blockchain will securely store digital rights and allow programs to execute securely. This
makes the merchant and rights management services completely P2P. It is impractical and
insecure for the content delivery service to store the content in the blockchain. Blockchain
size will increase to an impractical level, leading to blockchain storage centralization. And
any peer who has the blockchain will have every piece of content. Instead, the content will
be stored in a P2P file sharing network. The blockchain will be used by network peers to
restrict content access so peers cannot store files that they do not own. The content creator
will have to serve the file until it is purchased and downloaded by peers. In this system
content creators use a content packager to publish their content to the blockchain and the
P2P filesharing network. Consumers pay the content’s contract to gain access rights. Con-
sumers then request the content from the P2P filesharing network. When content has been
received and verified the user can view the content.
4.2 The Blockchain
The merchant service and rights management service will be implemented using con-
tracts on a private Ethereum network so the blockchain will only be for this system. Calling
contract functions requires the contract’s address and interface. A header and hub system
was implemented to assist in contract function calls. The header contract stores the file-
name, hub address, and hub interface. The header is standardized so the interface does
not change for each content, allowing the interface to be known in advance. The header
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information is used to interact with the hub contract. The hub stores addresses and inter-
faces of the license mint contract, the verification contract, and the index server directory
contract. The license mint contract stores the digital rights, the price to gain rights, and is
used to purchase digital rights. The verification contract stores the SHA-256 hash to verify
received files. The index server directory contract stores information required to communi-
cate with index servers to find P2P filesharing peers, allowing for index servers to be added
or removed.
There were multiple iterations of the systems deployed on the blockchain during de-
velopment. The first system was insecure. The second system was a secure system. The
third and final system is a more efficient and secure system.
4.2.1 Insecure System The initial system allows content creators to publish con-
tent and deploy contracts. The content creators create the content and write the contracts.
The system is described in Figure 7. This system is insecure, as content creators can write
flawed or malicious contracts. Using insecure contracts causes unintended results, such as
the consumer paying too much or not gaining access rights.
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Figure 7: Insecure System
4.2.2 Secure System The secure system does not allow content creators to write
their own contracts, to prevent flawed or malicious contracts. This requires a trusted third
party to create the contracts to ensure consistency of contract implementations across con-
tent creators. The third party creates factory contracts for use by content creators, shown
in Figure 8. A factory is a type of contract whose job is to create other contracts. To re-
duce the trust required, the factory stores its source code on the blockchain. The content
creators call a factory function to create new contracts for their content, shown in Figure
9. The factory addresses are listed on a factory lookup contract, helping content creators
locate every factory. Factory produced contract addresses are placed on a contract lookup,
helping consumers locate every content’s contracts. The interface of each contract created
by the same factory will be identical. To improve space efficiency, interfaces are stored in
the interface lookup contract and are given an interface ID. The header and hub store the
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interface ID, using the interface lookup to retrieve the interface.
Figure 8: Secure System - Factory Creation
Figure 9: Secure System - Content Publishing
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4.2.3 Efficient System The efficient system is secure and more space efficient.
The secure system wastes storage by creating identical bytecode each time a factory cre-
ates a contract, illustrated in Figure 10. The efficient system removes the replication of
bytecode, shown in Figure 11. Content license contracts, which store data for multiple
contents, are used instead of factories. The trusted third party creates the content license,
shown in Figure 12. The content license stores its own source code. The content license
combines the functionality of the license mint, verification, and index server directory con-
tracts. Content producers call a content license function to add the required data for their
content, shown in Figure 13. The amount of storage saved on each node with the efficient
design is shown in equation 4.1. The calculations to get equation 4.1 are in the appendix.
kb f + kd f +nb− kb (4.1)
with
n = number of content
k = number of license standards
b = size of bytecode
b f = size of factory bytecode
d f = size of factory state variables
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Figure 10: Naive Design with Redundant Bytecode
Figure 11: Efficient Design Eliminating Redundancy
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Figure 12: Efficient System - License Creation
Figure 13: Efficient System - Content Publishing
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4.3 P2P Filesharing Network
The content delivery service’s P2P filesharing network is like the BitTorrent tracker
system. Peers in the network rely on index servers for peer discovery. Any peer can run an
index server, listing it individually on the blockchain for any number of contents. There is
not a limit on the number of index servers per content. Serving peers list themselves on the
index server. Downloading peers get a list of peers serving the file from the index server.
The sequence of activities involving the index server is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Index Server Activity
1 Index Server lists itself for the file on the blockchain
2 Index Server starts index for the file
3 Producer lists themselves on the file’s index
4 Consumer asks Index Server for servers
The peer list is used to request content from peers. Files are transferred if the requester
has rights on the blockchain. When requesting content, peers include their public key from
the blockchain. Peers prove they own the public key by signing a nonce chosen by the
serving peer. The serving peer validates the signature and checks if the public key has
rights on the blockchain. The serving peer then sends the file to the requester. The file is
not chunked like in BitTorrent in this prototype. The content request process is shown in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Content Request from P2P Network
Received files are validated by comparing the SHA-256 hash to the stored hash on the
blockchain. The P2P filesharing network uses hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to trans-
mit information and files. HTTP is used for its wide adoption and available libraries. The
peer list is transmitted in JavaScript object notation format (JSON). JSON libraries enable
easy packing and unpacking of transferred data. The sequence of events for a consumer to
get the file from a producer is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Sequence of Consumer getting content from Producer
1 Producer places content data on the blockchain
2 Index Server lists itself for the file on the blockchain
3 Index Server starts index for the file
4 Producer lists themselves on the file’s index
5 Producer begins serving file
6 Consumer pays for access rights (blockchain)
7 Consumer asks Index Server for servers
8 Consumer asks Producer for file
9 Producer serves to Consumer
10 Consumer lists themselves on the files index
11 Consumer begins serving file
12 Consumer2 pays for access rights (blockchain)
13 Consumer2 asks Index Server for servers
14 Consumer2 asks Producer or Consumer for file
15 Producer or Consumer serves to Consumer2
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4.4 Content Protection
Content protection relies on encryption to prevent content from being accessible to
attackers and uses watermarks to locate the source of a leak. Secret keys are not amenable
to a fully P2P CDN. Key servers create a central failure point, which could prevent content
from being viewed by peers with rights. A key stored on the blockchain is insecure, as it
is accessible to every peer who has the blockchain. Giving authorized peers the key will
result in a leak allowing anyone to decrypt the content. Individualized watermarks change
the cryptographic hash of a file for each peer preventing content validation.
4.4.1 Whitebox Whitebox cryptography is used to protect keys in software appli-
cations that are executed on untrusted devices [29]. Whitebox cryptography combines the
secret key into the cipher in an obfuscated manner. Whitebox ciphers allow the content to
be stored in an encrypted form. Ciphers should be generated for each content or a limited
number of contents. Individual ciphers can make key theft economically irrational com-
pared to purchasing content. If all contents share the same cipher, key theft will have a
greater reward and may be economically rational. The cipher may delay key theft, protect-
ing content creators’ revenue streams. The SHA-256 hash of the cipher should be stored on
the blockchain and the ciphers stored in the P2P filesharing network to prevent blockchain
centralization. Cipher access should only be given to rights holders, so key thieves must
purchase the content, to further reduce incentive for key theft. The use of whitebox ciphers
may not be beneficial. Even when decrypted in small portions the content will be vulner-
able to leak. Using systems like HDCP to protect the content in transit to the display may
prevent indefinite access to content. When HDCP is no longer supported by computers the
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system to display the content will no longer operate unless it is updated. To update the
system the secret key would be required to rebuild the whitebox, leading to the initial prob-
lem the whitebox was trying to fix. Because of the long term support issues of whitebox
cryptography it is not included in this design.
4.4.2 Non-Encryption Protection Service superior to pirated networks protects
content by incentivizing consumers to use legitimate services. Service quality can be in-
creased through economic incentive. Paying index and peer servers incentivizes uptime
and serving peers, increasing quality and quantity of service. Consumers paying for peer
discovery and file delivery will not increase the overall cost. Server costs are factored
into the content prices when purchasing from regular CDNs like Netflix or iTunes. Since
content producers do not have to run servers the cost to purchase content will decrease.
Server cost efficiency may increase for some content and decrease for others. Centralized
CDNs use economies of scale to reduce costs and increase efficiency, the loss of economies
of scale will decrease efficiency. Competition drives innovation and reduces cost, and the
competition among peers may reduce costs and increase efficiency. Content served by large
distributers may have the cost of delivery increase as competition’s benefit is outweighed
by the loss of economies of scale. Content served by small distributers may see the cost of





The system design previously described was implemented to validate it and measure
its performance in a realistic scenario. The version of Ethereum used in the implementation
is Geth 1.7.2, with Solidity 0.4.11 used to write contracts. These are not the most recent
versions of Geth or Solidity. Ethereum is currently under development with new versions
being released frequently. The version was pinned to stop updates from breaking software.
The version of Python used in the implementation is 3.6.3 so the secrets module could be
used for secure random numbers. Flask is used for the HTTP servers. The version of Flask
used is 0.12.2. The testbed interacts with Amazon Web Services, and the API module used
is Boto3 1.4.7. An overview of the software used is in Table 4.








5.2.1 Simulated Environment The environment being simulated is consumers us-
ing extra resources on their computer (or old computers) to serve files. Peers have 2 core
processors with moderate clock speeds. Peers have small hard drives to represent extra
storage or smaller disk machines. Index servers are dedicated home computers with more
resources than consumer peers. Miners are dedicated computers with larger amounts of
RAM and processing than other peers. Peers are assumed to be running in private resi-
dences with low to moderate speed network connections. Contracts are on the blockchain
prior to testing because the creation of the contracts would not affect most consumers buy-
ing content.
5.2.2 Testbed The testbed is on AWS because of the free credits they give to stu-
dents and previous experience with their cloud. The testbed has a dedicated machine for
the miner and bootnode. The other machines are producers, consumers, or index servers.
The machines are networked in an Amazon Virtual Private Cloud and are not open to the
public internet, aside from SSH connections. An overview of the testbed is shown in Figure
15.
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Figure 15: AWS Testbed
Each machine runs a program that simulates the behavior of its user. The consumer
simulator purchases every content listed on the blockchain in random order and requests
content immediately after purchase. The consumer simulator runs a peerclient to download
files and a peerserver that serves downloaded files. The producer simulator generates ran-
dom files and lists them for purchase on the blockchain. After the producer simulator has
created the files it starts a peer server to serve its newly created files to the network. The
random files are 5.5 gigabyte blank files with a small amount of random data appended at
the end to prevent hash collisions. The files are transferred uncompressed, and the size of
5.5 gigabytes was chosen as a middle ground between small files and large files that have
been compressed.
The index simulator manages indexserver data for each file on the blockchain, while
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checking for new content on the blockchain periodically. The miner simulator will run
the miner, so data can be added to the blockchain. The programs need Ether to append
data onto the blockchain or purchase content. The bootnode simulator runs a bootnode and
sends Ether to peers for testing. The bootnode was arbitrarily chosen to send Ether for
testing.
Peers needing Ether send messages with their Ethereum addresses to the bootnode
using Amazon’s simple queue service (SQS). SQS stores a queue on an AWS operated
server, so peers can push items onto or pull items from the queue over a network connection.
The bootnode reads n messages, with n being the number of peers requiring Ether, this is
required for testing and is not part of the system. The mining difficulty was minimized to
reduce resources required for testing. This should not affect the results since the difficulty
is automatically adjusted to meet the targeted block interval of 17 seconds, and blocks were
mined in advance to create the Ether sent out to peers for testing.
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Chapter 6: Results
6.1 Data Gathering Method
All the timing data is gathered from the consumer simulators and focuses on the con-
sumer experience. The data was gathered by pushing the current time onto an AWS SQS
queue at the start and end of each task. After each test, the messages were gathered from
the queue and the time to complete each task was calculated. The time reported is the
average time to complete each task during a test. Multiple tests were run with an increas-
ing number of consumers to test the scalability of the system. The test configurations are
shown in Table 5. In every configuration a producer generates and serves 1 file. There is
one Bootnode in each test to coordinate the Ethereum clients. There is one miner in each
test to produce blocks. There is one index server in each test to coordinate P2P filesharing
peers. The program was not ran at scales larger than those in Table 5 because of the costs
to run tests.
Table 5: Test Configurations
BootNodes IndexServers Producers Consumers Miners Cost/Hour
1 1 1 1 1 $0.45
1 1 10 10 1 $1.69
1 1 10 20 1 $2.37
1 1 10 40 1 $3.74
1 1 10 80 1 $6.48
1 1 10 160 1 $12.00
1 1 10 237 1 $17.24
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6.2 Results
The total time it takes to purchase and completely download a file was measured. To
better characterize the performance of the prototype implementation, the components of
total time are also measured these are purchase time, get index server time, get peers time,
and download time. For analysis, the components are combined, as shown in Table 6, to
produce the combined metrics of query time, blockchain time, pre download time, and total
time.
Table 6: Combined Metrics
Purchase Get IndexServer Get Peers Get File
Total Time X X X X
Query Time X X X
Blockchain Time X X
Pre-Download X X X
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Figure 16: Total Time
Total time is the duration from when a consumer decides to get a file until they have
the entire file. Figure 16 shows that total time grows linearly as the number of consumers
is increased. In the small scale testing with 10 consumers the total time is just over 4
minutes (249 seconds) with 87% of the total time being download time and 6% of the total
time being get peers time. At the largest scale tested total time is over 18 minutes (1105
seconds) with 48% of the total time being download time and 49% of the total time being
get peers time. The total time is dominated by get peers time and download time with get
peers becoming a larger portion of total time as scale increases.
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Figure 17: Query Time
Query time is how long it takes a consumer to retrieve a file they own. As shown
in Figure 17 the query time increases linearly as the number of consumers is increased.
Query time is like total time since they are made of the same components with total time
also having purchase time. With 10 consumers query time is just below 4 minutes (234
seconds). At the largest scale tested the query time is just below 18 minutes (1073 seconds).
Query time is dominated by get peer time and download time which make up over 99% of
query time at each scale tested.
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Figure 18: Blockchain Time
Blockchain time is how long it takes for the consumers blockchain read and write oper-
ations. Figure 18 shows that blockchain time increases linearly as the number of consumers
increases, with the slope decreasing after the 80 consumer test. In the lower scale tests, the
blockchain time is between 15 to 20 seconds. In the larger scale tests, the blockchain time
is between 30 and 35 seconds. Blockchain time is dominated by the time to purchase the
content, which is the only time the consumer writes to the blockchain. This confirms that
writing to a blockchain takes longer than reading the blockchain.
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Figure 19: Pre-Download Time
Pre-download time is how long a consumer must wait before starting the file down-
load. As shown in Figure 19 pre-download time increases linearly as the number of con-
sumers increases. In the small scale test with 10 consumers pre-download time is 32 sec-
onds, with 46% of the time being purchase time. In the largest scale test pre-download
time is over 9 minutes (578 seconds), with 5% of the time being purchase time and 94%
of the time being get peers time. As the scale is increased the get peers time becomes the
dominant component of pre-download time.
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Figure 20: Purchase Time
Purchase time is how long it takes to acquire rights after a consumer decides to pur-
chase a file. Purchase time involves transactions in Ethereum and requires the consumer
making the purchase and the miner. As shown in Figure 20 the purchase time doubles as the
number of consumers (and transactions) increases. Initially the purchases were included
in the next block, but as the number of transactions increased it took two blocks for the
purchase to be included. The decrease in slope after 80 consumers is caused by reduced
parallel purchase transactions which resulted in relatively faster purchase times. Due to
implementation issues, which are described later in this chapter, some consumers wait sig-
nificantly longer than others for a file. This makes some consumers purchase their next file
later than the others with the purchase transaction sent after other consumers transactions
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have been mined.
Figure 21: IndexServer Time
Get index server time is how long it takes for a consumer to get the list of index
servers for a content. Get index server time is the consumer reading from their copy of the
blockchain with the index server having previously sent a transaction to the miner to list
themselves as index serving for the content. Figure 21 shows that the time to get the list
of IndexServers is consistently under 1 second. The spike at 10 consumers is likely caused
by inconsistency in the testbed not the system design. Three peers in this test had high get
index times that were consistently between 2 to 3 seconds, while the other peers performed
similar to peers in other tests. Get index time is not affected by test scale because it is a
local disk read.
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Figure 22: Peer Time
Get peers time is how long it takes for the consumer to get the list of serving peers
from the index server. The peers involved in get peers time are the consumer and the index
server and has no activity occurring on the blockchain. Figure 22 shows that the time to
get the peer information from the index server increases linearly with the number of con-
sumers. The poor performance of the index server is caused by the implementation and
is not inherent in the concept of combining P2P filesharing and blockchain. The perfor-
mance is caused by limiting the number of peers allowed to communicate simultaneously
with the index server to prevent out of memory exceptions. This limit was needed since
libraries used to run the index server consumed large amounts of memory to create threads
when serving clients. Limiting the number of peers allowed to communicate simultane-
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ously causes a line of peers waiting for routing information. This line of peers causes some
peers to begin downloading much earlier than others causing them to finish downloading
first. This reduces the number of consumers sending parallel purchase transactions.
Figure 23: Download Time
Download time is how long it takes to download the file from a peer. The peers in-
volved in download time are the consumer and a peer running a peer server, this could be
the producer or a consumer who has the file. No activity occurs on the blockchain, but the
peer server requires the consumer to have purchased the file. As shown in Figure 23 the
download time increases linearly as the number of consumers increases. The increase in
average download time is caused by increased load on the peer servers with more clients
asking for files at once from each index server. The load is the worst during each con-
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sumer’s first download when only the producers are serving the files to all the consumers.
The implementation of the P2P network does not have peers serve the chunks of file they
have downloaded before the download has finished. Serving chunks would reduce the ef-
fects of increased load by having peers serve sooner.
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Chapter 7: Discussion
Given the performance of the P2P filesharing network implementation it is important
to look at the theoretical performance of the blockchain. The transactions per second (tps)
of the system will be used to measure the scalability. Purchase transactions are used to
calculate the tps because they are the most common type of transaction and have the largest
direct effect on the consumer experience. Equation 7.1 will be used to calculate tps.
ts = tb/s (7.1)
with
ts = transactions per second
tb = transactions per block
s = seconds per block
The transactions per block is unknown and the seconds per block is known with the
time between blocks at 17 seconds. Equation 7.2 is used to calculate the number of trans-
actions per block.
tb = cb/ct (7.2)
with
tb = transactions per block
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cb = complexity per block
ct = complexity per transaction
Computational complexity in Ethereum is measured in a unit called gas. The com-
pexity per block is the default targeted block gas limit of 4000000. The complexity per
transaction is the average complexity of a purchase. Before gathering results, multiple pur-
chases were performed and the average complexity of a purchase was 57400 gas. With the
complexity per block and the complexity per transaction about 70 purchase transactions
can fit in a block.
The test results confirmed the calculation when purchase time doubled between 40
consumers and 80 consumers, showing that a block was filled, and another was required to
process the transactions. The purchase time data shown in Figure 20 appears to outperform
the theoretical results in Figure 24 in the larger scale tests but the number of consumers
is not equivalent to the number of parallel purchases. In smaller scale tests, the number
of consumers was essentially equivalent to the number of parallel purchases, but as scale
increased and performance issues occurred consumers were sending purchases in parallel
less often weakening the relationship between the two. The stairstep pattern of the theoret-
ical scalability is because multiple values for parallel purchases require the same number
of blocks. When only part of a block is required the consumers still must wait the full 17
seconds for the block to be made.
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Figure 24: Theoretical Scalability
7.1 Scale Comparison
In 2012 Netflix users viewed 5.1 TV shows and 3.4 movies per week [30]. Netflix
had 40.28 million viewers in the 3rd quarter of 2012 and 109.25 million viewers in the 3rd
quarter of 2017 [31]. This averages 8.5 transactions per week. Using the 2012 viewership
requires a CDN that supports 566.10 transactions per second (tps). Using the 2017 view-
ership, assuming content consumption is the same as 2012, requires a tps of 1535.42. The
current upper bound for Bitcoin is about 7 tps [32]. The current upper bound for Ethereum
is about 15 tps [32]. The implemented system is capable of 70 purchases per block, with
1 block produced every 17 seconds, and thus can support 4.1 purchases per second. When
compared to enterprise-scale CDNs, the implemented system faces bottlenecks with the
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current generation of blockchain technology.
7.2 Future Work
Future work should address the scalability issues to improve consumer experience.
Methods to improve scalability that can be investigated to improve a blockchain digital
rights management system are block limit increase, the lightning network, and sharding.
Increasing the block size or complexity limits has been used by BitcoinCash [33] and
Ethereum miners [34]. This method quickly increases the transaction rate, but it is not
a long term solution because it requires additional resources proportional to the increase in
transaction rate. The lightning network creates secure transactions off the blockchain [35].
The lightning network routes currency through cryptographically secured payment chan-
nels. If a peer does not correctly route currency, then proof can be published to the
blockchain to resolve the conflict. Sharding divides the verification or storage of transac-
tions among multiple subsets of peers [32]. Each subset handles its portion of transactions
and requests information from peers in other subsets when required. Sharding is supposed
to be secure if each subset of peers is sufficiently large.
Other challenges that can be addressed in future work are the free rider problem and
multiple copy storage. In a P2P filesharing network the free rider problem is a peer that
downloads content and does not serve peers, which results in worse service for peers. A
potential fix to the free rider problem is to use cryptocurrency micropayments between
peers to cover the costs of and incentivize file serving. Files with more copies stored are
more likely to be available in the future. Cryptocurrency distribution for storing copies of
files might incentivize storage of a minimum number of copies of a file.
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APPENDIX A: Storage Calculations
Definitions
n = number of content
k = number of license standards
s = Total storage on single blockchain node
b = size of bytecode
d = size of state variables
b f = size of factory bytecode
d f = size of factory state variables
Assumptions
b0 = b1 = bn
d0 = d1 = dn
b f 0 = b f 1 = b f n
d f 0 = d f 1 = d f n
k << n
Factory Method Calculations
s = k(b f +d f )+n(b+d)
License Method Calculations
s = nd + kb
Difference Calculations
67
kb f + kd f +nd − (nd + kb)
kb f + kd f +nb− kb
